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STRICT TORT LIABILITY IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
The assault upon the citadel, having proceeded apace for 35 years,'
has achieved spectacular victory. Strict liability in tort as a remedy for
the manufacture and sale of defective products has won the day.2 Once
applied only in the food and beverage area, strict liability is now being
applied to consumer products of every type, and the Restatement3 reflects
this strong judicial trend. It is difficult to speculate as to the impact
strict liability will have on the various industries to which it is now being
Applied. Not enough cases have been decided in any particular area to
elicit any definite reactions. Strict liability seems to be, in fact, just one
part of a political and social climate exhibiting increased concern for the
consumer, and it is probable that the most significant changes in the
consumer products industries will result from legislation,4 not tort verdicts.
1. Justice Cardozo observed, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174
N.E. 441, 445 (1931), "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace." Dean Prosser came to the same conclusion in 1960. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1148 (1960).
2. The background and development of strict tort liability has been extensively dis-
cussed. See, in particular, the following authorities: 1 FRua sR & Fr.IEmAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY §§ 16-16A (1963); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.16 (1956); 1 HuRSH, AMERi-
CAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABmiTy § 6.62 (1961); PROSSR, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964); Feezer,
Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37
MicH. L. REv. 1 (1938); Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1
DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1963); James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18
LA. L. REV. 293 (1958); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TE. L. REV. 923 (1957); James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV.
192 (1955); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937) ; Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of
Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 693; Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault
and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-
Current Developments, 40 TEXAs L. REV. 193 (1961); Keeton & Roberts, Implied War-
ranties-The Privity Rule and Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194
(1962); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past
Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965); Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50
A.BA.J. 446 (1964); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Pound, Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. REV. 167
(1960); Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 CEVELAND B.A.J.
167 (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Note, Limitations Upon the Remedy of "Strict
Tort" Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods-Has the "Citadel" Been Dev-
astated?, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 300 (1965); Note, Sales-Liability of Manufacturer to
Remote Vendee for Breach of Warranty-"Prvity of Warranty," 29 B.U.L. REv. 107 (1949).
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RFSTATEMENT].
4. Regulatory legislation in the various consumer products industries, analogous to the
food and drug statutes, would be one possibility. Another would be a Code approach,
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Strict liability, nevertheless, does have an effect on the character of
products liability litigation, and it is reasonable to expect that this effect
will be felt more strongly in some industries than in others. An example
of a large and important consumer products area where strict liability
might be expected to have a significant impact is the automobile industry.
The automobile manufacturers, we are told,5 have met the advent of
strict liability with patient resignation, insisting that they have won most
of the cases brought against them and stressing that most automobile
accidents are still the fault of the driver. The ,automobile industry does
admit to certain worrisome aspects of the doctrine of strict liability,
particularly that an inference can always be drawn, when the manufac-
turer makes necessary design changes or incorporates new safety devices;
that previous models were not made as safely as possible, and were thus
defective.6 Many authorities in the area believe this inference to be more
than justified. They claim that automobiles have not been made as safely
as possible, and that much of the responsibility for the annual tragedy
on the highways can be traced directly to the automobile manufacturers. 7
The increase in the number of lawsuits against automobile manufacturers
in recent years indicates, at least prima facie, that this view is becoming
widespread. Approximately 1000 such suits were brought in 1964, and it
has been predicted that some 5000 suits will be brought in 1966. Further
geometric increases in the number of automobile products liability suits
are expected,9 and many, if not most, of these suits will be tried under
the strict tort liability theory. It shall be the purpose of this comment
then, to examine the effect of strict liability on what promises to be one
of the most active areas of products liability litigation.
WHAT IS "STRICT TORT" LIABILITY?
Before turning to an examination of the effect of strict tort liability on
automobile products liability litigation, it is essential to first define strict
tort liability and state generally how it changes prior theories in the
products liability area. The history of products liability and the evolution
providing a single unified system of products liability law. See, for a strong argument as
to the need for this, Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communica-
tion Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965).
5. BusINEss WEEx, Aug. 28, 1965, p. 30.
6. Id. at 31.
7. See, e.g., NADER, UNSAFE AT AN SPEED (1965); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manu-
facturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1956) ; Nader, Auto-
mobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42 DENvER L.C.J. 32 (1965);
O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299 (1963); Philo, Automobile
Products Liability Litigation, 4 DUQuEsNE L. Rav. 181 (1965).
8. BusiNEss WEEK, Aug. 28, 1965, p. 30.
9. Philo, supra note 7, at 182.
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of the strict tort remedy have been discussed extensively,"° and there is
no need for repetition here. The Restatement recognizes the strict tort
liability of the seller of defective products, and this provides a convenient
basis for discussion. The Restatement provides:
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property,
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the con-
dition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Strict tort liability, as defined by the Restatement, is essentially the
same as the sales warranty of merchantability stripped of all contractual
elements." Subsection (1) (a) limits coverage to sellers engaged in the
business of selling such a product, which is similar to the requirements
of section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act and section 2-314 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Subsection (2) (b) recognizes that privity of contract
is no longer a requirement, and thus any seller in the distributive chain
is potentially liable to the ultimate user or consumer. Overcoming the
privity requirement was probably the major step in the evolution of
strict tort liability,'2 but other contractual aspects of warranty also caused
complications. Two such problems, both recognized under the Uniform
Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, were the requirement of
giving notice of breach of warranty by the buyer to the seller and the
possibility of disclaimer of warranties by the seller. Several of the leading
strict liability cases were especially concerned with elimination of these
problems. 13 The recognition of the sale of a defective product as a tortious
wrong existing apart from any contract between the parties now makes
10. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
11. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
12. PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 677-78 (3d ed. 1964).
13. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rep. 697 (1963),
dealing with the notice problem, and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391
P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rep. 896 (1964) and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), treating the problem of disclaimer of warranties.
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notice requirements, disclaimers, and other agreements between the
parties inapplicable.14
Long before the days of strict liability, three exceptions to the privity
requirement were developed by the courts: (1) a seller who knew a
product was dangerous and neglected to inform the buyer of this fact
could be held liable to a third person injured by such use;' 5 (2) a seller
could be held liable when the product was used on his premises, the
user being treated as an invitee; 6 (3) a seller could be held liable to a
third party for injuries caused by a product "imminently" or "inherently"
dangerous to human life -or safety.'" In MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,"5 the class of inherently dangerous articles was greatly extended by
Judge Cardozo's statement that, "if the nature of a thing is such that it
is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger." 9 The rule of the MacPherson case
was extended by degrees, to impose negligence liability upon the supplier
of any chattel or component part for personal injury or property damage
to anyone in the vicinity of its probable use.2" Subsection (2) (a) of
section 402A eliminates negligence as a requirement, and thus the Restate-
ment would seem to include all three of the early exceptions to the privity
requirement within its rule. The Restatement, however, extends its cover-
age to a "user or consumer" only, and in a caveat states that it expresses
no opinion as to whether the section will apply to persons other than
users or consumers or to the seller of a component part. Thus the present
coverage of strict tort liability, according to the Restatement, is not as
broad as under a negligence theory, even though intermediate sellers in
the distributive chain, previously not liable unless negligent, are now
strictly liable.
Section 402A(1) requires that the defective condition of the product
at the time of sale render it "unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property." Comment d to section 402A indicates that
the strict liability rule applies "to products which, if they are defective,
may be expected to and do cause 'physical harm'." Thus, the "unreason-
ably dangerous" defective product, required by the Restatement, is
14. RESTATEMENT, § 402A, comment m; Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability
in General, 36 CLEVELAND B.A.J. 167, 168 (1965). But see Shanker, supra note 4, at 23-30
for an analysis of the leading strict tort cases and the conclusion that the same results in
these cases could have been reached under the Uniform Commercial Code.
15. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 659-60.
16. Id. at 660.
17. Ibid.
18. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
19. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
20. Prosser, supra notq 1, at UQ0O-02.
[Vol. 4:567
COMMENTS
essentially the same as the "imminently" or "inherently" dangerous
article defined in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,"' and this require-
ment does not seem to be a limitation on the strict tort liability theory.
Subsection (1)(b) requires that the defective product "reach the user
or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold," and Comment g states that the burden of proving the condition is
upon the injured plantiff. Existence of the defect at the time the product
left the seller's possession and control was always a requirement in both
a negligence action and in an action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability,2 2 and strict tort liability thus retains it. The reason for
this requirement, of course, is that otherwise the defect could not be
attributed to the seller in any way, and there would be no justification
for holding him liable. The Restatement in a caveat states that it expresses
no opinion as to products which are expected to be processed or otherwise
substantially changed before they reach the user or consumer. This is
related to the question of the liability of the manufacturer of component
parts, on which the Restatement also expresses no opinion. Comment p
to section 402A suggests, for products that are to be processed or sub-
stantially changed, that the question is essentially one of whether the
responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect is
shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes. The same
question applies when considering the liability of the manufacturer of
component parts. Whether or not the courts will adopt a test of this type
remains to be seen.
To summarize, then, the plaintiff in a strict tort action must be a user
or consumer of the defective product. The defendant can be any seller
of the defective product in the distributive chain who is engaged in the
business of selling such products. The plaintiff, to make out a prima
facie case, must prove first that his injury was factually caused by a
defect in the product and second that the defect existed when the product
left the hands of the defendant. Defendant's primary defense is to rebut
plaintiff's proof of causation and existence of the defect when it left
defendant's hands. Since plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant
was negligent, contributory negligence is not an affirmative defense.2
Evidence in the nature of contributory negligence could be offered, how-
ever, in rebutting plaintiff's prima facie case. Assumption of the risk,
defined as voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, is recognized as a defense. 4 Finally, Comment h to section 402A
states that a product is not defective if it is safe for normal handling and
21. Supra note 18.
22. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1114.
23. RESTATEMENT, § 402A, comment n.
24. Ibid.
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consumption, and therefore a "use different from or more strenuous than
that contemplated to be safe by ordinary users/consumers, that is,
'misuse,' would either refute a defective condition or causation. 25
Turning now to the specific application of the strict tort liability theory
to automobile products liability litigation, the analysis will employ the
following general categories: the defective product, the parties to the
litigation, plaintiff's prima facie case, and available defenses.
THE DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
Ever since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,26 it has been recognized
that the automobile27 is a thing of danger if defectively made, and no one
seriously doubts this. The annual toll of 50,000 deaths and two million
disabilities resulting from automobile accidents2 s indicates that the auto-
mobile is a thing of danger even if not defective. The presence of a defect
is required, however, if the seller or manufacturer is to be held liable
under strict tort, just as it was under a negligence theory and in an action
for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, for, as has been pointed
out, there would otherwise be no justification for holding the seller or
manufacturer liable. The automobile manufacturers and dealers are not
insurers in the sense that they guarantee accident-free use of their
product. Under strict tort liability, however, they do guarantee that the
automobile they sell is not defective and are held liable for any injuries
caused by the defective condition without regard to the degree of care
exercised.
A defect in a part or system of the automobile related to its operation
in motion, such as the steering or braking system, is the type of defect
ordinarily thought to make the automobile unreasonably dangerous.
Whether a defect in an automobile can cause harm without having
rendered the automobile unreasonably dangerous is a question which has
not been discussed in any of the strict tort cases. This is, at least,
theoretically possible, but it would seem that such defects would occur,
if at all, in systems other than those related to the operation in motion
of the automobile. This is not to say, however, that the only defects from
which liability will result must be in the braking system, steering, tires,
and the like. In Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co.,29 for example, plaintiff
recovered for injuries suffered when gasoline vapors, escaping from a
leak in the gasoline tank positioned in the trunk in such a way that the
25. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., supra note 11, at 429.
26. Supra note 18. In this case the manufacturer was held liable to the purchaser for
injuries suffered in an accident caused by a defective wheel on the automobile.
27. Although this comment is primarily concerned with automobile cases, the same
principles apply generally to all motor vehicles.
28. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs (1963-64 ed.).
29. 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961).
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vapors filled the car instead of being dispersed in the atmosphere, exploded
when plaintiff switched on the ignition. Other less obvious defects which
have been the basis of litigation are defective designs of various
automobile systems, such as the rear suspension system,"° the hood latch,"'
and the ignition and gear control system. 2 In Mickle v. Blackman,
Cherokee Const. Co. & Ford Motor Co.,"3 plaintiff, a passenger in a car
involved in an accident, recovered from the manufacturer for injuries
suffered when, as a result of the crash, she was thrown against and be-
came impaled upon the gearshift lever which was inadequately guarded.
A comprehensive treatment of the defects from which liability will result
is beyond the scope of this comment.3 4 It is to be noted that strict liability
is not of any aid here. Better techniques of proof, coupled with the
attorney's imaginative investigation and construction of his case, are the
significant elements in proving that an automobile was defective.
PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION
Plaintiffs
The plaintiff in a strict tort action must, at present, be a user of the
automobile. Comment 1 to section 402A of the Restatement provides that
passive users, such as passengers in a car or airplane, are included in the
coverage of the section. The lessee of an automobile would also be con-
sidered a user as would a member of the family of the owner or lessee.
Those possible plaintiffs excluded from the coverage of section 402A
are pedestrians, owners of property damaged by the defective automobile,
and the driver and passengers of other cars on the road. This distinction
cannot logically be defended, and seems to be the last remnant of the
old privity idea. For example, an employee of a gasoline station injured
when the brakes on a car fail while its owner is driving it into the station
could not sue in strict tort, but if the owner had left the car at the station
for servicing and the same accident happened while the car was being
driven by another employee, then the injured party would presumably
have an action in strict tort. Similarly, if the same accident happened,
and the car struck a group of pedestrians, one of whom was a member of
30. See the discussion of the Corvair cases in NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, Chap. 1
(1965).
31. Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946). The defective
latch would permit the hood to spring when the car was subjected to a severe jolt or jar.
32. Muncy v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 906 E.D. Tex., Marshall Div., April 10,
1964 (appeal pending in U.S. Ct. of Appeals for 5th Cir.). Plaintiff showed that it was
possible to remove the ignition key from the switch with the motor running and the car
in a forward drive position. Plaintiff was injured when a passenger accidentally stepped on
the accelerator while disembarking from the car in that exact situation, causing it to jump
the curb and pin plaintiff against a wall.
33. Circuit Ct., 6th Judicial Cir., York County, S.C., March (1963).
34. See Philo, supra note 7, at 196-213 for a checklist of various types of defects.
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the owner's family, that person could presumably sue in strict tort, while
the other injured pedestrians could not. The illogic of this distinction is
thus apparent.
Under any of the theories advanced as a justification for the adoption
of strict tort liability the limitation that plaintiffs must be users or con-
sumers cannot be defended. The risk-spreading argument 5 -that man-
ufacturers as a group should absorb the inevitable losses which must
result in a complex civilization from use of their products, because they
are in a better position to do so, and can, through their prices and liability
insurance, pass on such losses to the community at large-would surely
include injuries to bystanders as part of the inevitable losses which result
from use of a product. Furthermore, since the loss is to be distributed to
the community at large, there is all the more reason not to deny the
benefit of an action in strict tort to any member of the community who
may foreseeably be injured. The argument that the public interest in
human life, health, and safety demands the maximum possible protec-
tion that the law can give against dangerous defects in consumer goods 36
would likewise extend to injured bystanders the same protection accorded
users or consumers. Finally the argument that strict liability was adopted
through consumer pressure, since, by placing the goods on the market,
the supplier represents to the public that they are suitable and safe for
use, and that the consumers rely on this when making purchases3 7 would
not exclude bystanders from coverage. It would not require a presump-
tion of a high degree of altruism on the part of the user to assume that in
addition to himself and his family, he also would not want the product
he buys to injure others. Thus an action in strict tort should not be
limited to users or consumers, but should be available to any foreseeable
plaintiff who is injured in the vicinity of probable use of the product.
Defendants
Sellers engaged in the business of selling automobiles include man-
ufacturers, new car dealers, used car dealers, wholesale distributors,
and foreign car importers, and any of these sellers in the distributive
chain of a defective automobile could be held strictly liable in tort to
the ultimate user for injuries caused by the defect. If the automobile
has passed through the hands of several retail dealers before being sold to
a consumer, as is very common in automobile merchandising, all of these
dealers would be potentially liable in strict tort to the user. Any liability
of one seller to another in the nature of indemnification, however, would
35. This has been attributed to Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
36. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1122-23.
37. Id. at 1123.
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be determined under commercial law, not strict tort. An owner, not in the
business of selling automobiles, who sells his car to another private
individual or even to a dealer knowing that it will be resold, is also not
included within the coverage of strict tort. Such occasional sellers could
be liable for negligence, however, as for example, selling a car with a
known defect without giving notice of this to the buyer. The manufac-
turers of components may, at present, be liable for negligence only, but
it is possible that they may be strictly liable if the courts adopt a test
of whether their component was incorporated without the responsibility
for discovery and prevention of dangerous defects shifting to the man-
ufacturer. Tires, for example, may be the type of component for which
the tire manufacturers would be held strictly liable. Assuming such a test
were adopted, the liability of the manufacturer of the component would
nevertheless not discharge the liability of the manufacturer and sellers
of the automobile. Strict tort liability, by definition, arises from the sale
of a defective product no matter where the defect originated, and holding
the manufacturer of a component strictly liable would thus provide the
plaintiff with another potential party to sue. Again, any liability of
the manufacturers of components to the automobile manufacturers would
be determined under commercial law, not strict tort.
The liability of new car wholesalers and retailers is significantly
broader under strict tort than it was under the negligence or sales war-
ranty theories, while the liability of the manufacturers is not significantly
affected. The intermediate sellers of a new automobile usually can not
be held liable under a negligence theory, since they have no duty of in-
spection and testing of every system of the automobile which might
contain a latent defect, and, in a usual case, are simply not negligent3 8
Under the sales warranty theories, privity and notice requirements and
the possibility of disclaimer of liability operated as a bar to many of the
plaintiffs who now have an action against these intermediate sellers in
strict tort. The liability of the manufacturers, on the other hand, is not
significantly affected by the adoption of a strict tort theory. Manufacturers
are liable for negligence, and the point has been made 39 that once the
plaintiff has proved that the defect in the product caused his injury and
existed when the product left the hands of the defendant, he can rely on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or its practical equivalents to get his case
to the jury on the negligence issue. Plaintiff's burden of proof in a strict
tort action is thus essentially the same as in a suit based on a negligence
theory. It is true that in a negligence action the manufacturer can intro-
duce evidence of due care to rebut the inference of negligence, but as a
practical matter, "in cases against manufacturers, once the cause of the
38. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1118.
39. Id. at 1114-15.
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harm is laid at their doorstep, a jury verdict for the defendant on the
negligence issue is virtually unknown."40
It would seem, then, that the plaintiff in an automobile products
liability action involving a defective new car has gained very little by
the adoption of the strict tort theory. The manufacturers are the most
financially responsible of any of the defendants now possible under strict
tort, and they are the parties which plaintiffs desire to sue, not the inter-
mediate sellers. Jurisdiction in a suit against a manufacturer does not
seem to be a problem, as the manufacturers do business in every state,
and suits against them have been tried in practically all jurisdictions. 1 In
a usual case, then, a plaintiff would have no occasion to sue the inter-
mediate sellers. Furthermore, under a negligence theory, the liability of
the manufacturer of components and the coverage of all foreseeable
plaintiffs is well settled, and is not questionable as it is under strict tort.
Strict tort may make a difference, however, where foreign cars are in-
volved and the manufacturer is out of the jurisdiction. In this case, an
action in strict tort against the importer or seller (often an American
manufacturer) would give purchasers of foreign cars the same protection
presently enjoyed by purchasers of domestic automobiles. Another case in
which it has been suggested42 that strict tort may make a difference in the
products liability area would be a situation where plaintiff can prove
that the product was defective at the time he received it from the retail
dealer, but cannot prove that it was defective when it left the manufac-
turer's factory. This would commonly occur in the food and beverage
area, for example, where plaintiff's injury is caused by a broken glass
container (particles of glass in the food) and where it would be practically
impossible to prove that the glass was broken at the time it left the man-
ufacturer's factory. It is doubtful, however, whether this situation is
important in the automobile products liability area. An automobile re-
mains relatively unchanged as it moves from the manufacturer, to the
dealer, and finally to the consumer. Also, even if the final inspections,
corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the car ready for use
are left to the dealers, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co." held that this
fact does not enable the manufacturer to escape liability even if the defect
may have been caused by something one of its authorized dealers did or
failed to do, because it is, in a sense, a delegation of the final steps of
the manufacturing process to its authorized dealers. The effect of strict
tort on automobile products liability litigation involving new cars is there-
fore not very great, and the position of the plaintiff is not really improved
by suing under strict tort rather than under a negligence theory.
40. Id. at 1115.
41. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 460 (1961).
42. Prosser, supra note 1, at 1117.
43. 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899, 391 P.2d 168, 171 (1964).
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Strict tort may be significant, however, in actions involving used cars.
No case has yet been decided holding a used car dealer strictly liable in
tort, but nothing in the strict tort theory would prevent such a result. The
used car dealer is a seller engaged in the business of selling automobiles,
and the automobile industry certainly includes used car sales as part of
its merchandising scheme, since new car dealers also sell used cars.
Also, all of the arguments which have been advanced in favor of strict
liability, the need for maximum protection of the public, risk spreading,
and the like, apply equally well to used car sales. These dealers can
likewise protect themselves by products liability insurance, the cost of
which they pass on to the public at large, just as sellers of new cars are
now expected to do. Related to the problem of used car sales is the
question of the strict liability of the manufacturer as to "old" cars. Does
the manufacturer's liability, which attaches when the automobile is man-
ufactured, follow the automobile into and out of the hands of various
users and used car dealers until it finally reaches its ignoble end in a
junk yard? The answer should be yes, so long as the plaintiff can prove
that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's hands. In Mickle
v. Blackman, Cherokee Const. Co. & Ford Motor Co.," plaintiff recovered
in 1963 for injuries caused by a design defect in a 1949 Ford, and in
general, the manufacturer's liability on old cars will be largely for basic
designed-in defects. As to other defects, it would normally be difficult, if
not impossible, to prove that an accident caused by a locked steering
wheel, for example, was due to a defect existing when the automobile left
the manufacturer's hands if no trouble was experienced with the steering
for ten years prior to the accident. Similarly, the manufacturer will not
be liable for injuries caused by worn-out parts of the type which are
expected to wear out and require replacement, as for example, brake
linings and tires. It is in this area that strict tort will aid the purchaser
of an old car, in that the used car dealer will be held strictly liable for sel-
ling a car with a defect which cannot be traced back to the manufacturer.
PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA FACIE CASE
Plaintiff's prima facie case in a strict tort action is to prove that his
injury was factually caused by a defect in the product and that the defect
existed when the product left the hands of the defendant. As has been
pointed out, this is essentially the same burden of proof which the plaintiff
has under the negligence and sales warranty theories, and represents the
real hurdle which a plaintiff must overcome if he is to recover. Conversely,
the defendant's best defense is to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case. In this
part of the litigation, strict tort theory is of absolutely no help; the
strength of plaintiff's case depends, rather, on methods of obtaining the
available evidence and techniques of proof, and, in general, improve-
44. Supra note 33.
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ments in these methods and techniques will produce a much more sig-
nificant increase in the liability of manufacturers and sellers of defective
products than produced by the advent of strict tort. A detailed examina-
tion of the multitude of proof problems which can arise in automobile
products liability litigation would be far beyond the scope of this
comment, and would probably require a treatise. It shall be the purpose
of this section, rather, to point out a few of the most frequently occurring
problems which plaintiff must overcome in order to meet his burden
of proof.
As a general proposition, the mere fact that an automobile was involved
in an accident does not raise a presumption that it was defective. The
plaintiff must allege and prove by specific evidence that a defect existed.
In Sugai v. General Motors Corp.,45 for example, the plaintiff had alleged
that the defective condition of the left rear wheel and brake assembly
caused the wheel to lock and the automobile to go out of control, causing
his injuries. Plaintiff had no specific evidence that a defect existed,
however, and merely contended that because the rear wheel locked, there
must have been a defect. The court gave judgment for the defendant,
holding that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof. The nature
of the defect need not be precisely established, however,46 and this is an
area in which expert testimony is usually essential. In Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co.," plaintiff's expert witness could not testify as to the
precise cause of the defective condition of the brakes, but offered to show
by his testimony that there were only six possible causes, one or more of
which would have constituted a defect in design or manufacture attrib-
utable to the defendant. The trial court rejected this offer, but was re-
versed, the court holding that it was unreasonable to require the plaintiff
to make an election among a variety of possible defects, and that the
exact nature of the defect was a question of the jury. The same require-
ment of specific proof would also be applicable in proving causation, and
merely proving that an accident occurred would similarly be insufficient.4"
Proof that the automobile was defective some time after the occurrence
of the accident is no proof that the product was in the same defective
condition at the time of the accident without a showing that the condition
did not change in the interim.49. It is thus essential for the attorney in
preparing his case to allow the expert witness to make his examination of
the automobile soon after the accident, or else take steps to preserve the
automobile in an unchanged condition until the expert does make his
45. 137 F. Supp. 696 (Idaho 1956).
46. Gugliardo v. Ford Motor Co., 184 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 7 App. Div. 2d 472 (1959).
47. Supra note 43.
48. Young v. Willys Motors, Inc., 271 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1959).
49. McNamara v. American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1957).
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examination. Otherwise the expert's testimony could be rejected as in-
competent, as in Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp.,5" where the expert did not
inspect the automobile until some two years after the accident, and there
was no showing of lack of change in condition in the interim. Similarly,
proof that the automobile was defective at the time of the accident does
not raise a presumption that it was defective at the time it was under the
control of the manufacturer, 5 and plaintiff must also show here that there
was no change in the particular defective part between the time it left the
manufacturer's control and the time of the accident. In rebuttal, defendant
can introduce evidence that the automobile was entirely satisfactory up
until the occurence of the accident, as evidence of freedom from defect.52
Finally, even if a component is found broken after the occurrence
of an accident, this does not, in and of itself, establish that the componentwas defective or prove that the breaking of the component was the cause
of the accident. In Fisher v. Sheppard,5 3 plaintiff claimed that a defective
sleeve in the gear system had broken and caused the accident in which
he was injured. The judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that there was not enough evidence to establish that the
sleeve was defective prior to the collision and that it was equally probable
that the break resulted from the terrific impact of the crash. Proof that
the component was broken after the occurrence of the accident is generally
held to be some evidence that it was defective before the accident and
that its breaking was the causative factor of the accident, 4 but the defen-
dant can always rebut by showing that the post-accident condition of the
component was a result of the accident rather than indicative of its pre-
accident condition. 55
These few examples should serve to illustrate that the task of the
attorney handling an automobile products liability case is not an easy
one. 6 Careful investigation must be made at the scene of the accident,
and care must be taken to retain the automobile involved in the accident
in an unchanged condition until it can be examined by an expert. An
expert witness is a necessity in most cases, because of the difficult
50. 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953).
51. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metal Products Co., 203 F.2d 838 (8th
Cir. 1953).
52. McNamara v. American Motors Corp., supra note 49.
53. 366 Pa. 347, 77 A.2d 417 (1951).
54. Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1954). In this case, the issue
was whether the nut fastening the steering wheel to the shaft was defectively made and
caused the steering wheel to come off, or whether it came off as a result of the accident.
55. Lovas v. General Motors Corp., supra note 54; Peterman v. Indian Motorcycle Co.,
216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954).
56. See Phio, The Plaintiff's Attorney and the Products Liability Case, 3 DuQuEsNE L.
REv. 39 (1964).
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technical questions involved, and in some cases an accident reconstruction
specialist could be used advantageously. The attorney himself must also
research sources of engineering information and techniques, and, as a
practioner in the area, should keep generally up-to-date on technical
developments in the industry. Finally, careful preparation for trial is
required, including the extensive taking of depositions and interrogatories,
if plaintiff is to recover.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES
Defendant's primary defense, as has been pointed out, is to rebut
plaintiff's proof of causation and existence of the defect when it left the
control of the defendant, and defendant may utilize the same techniques
of proof in defense as are available to the plaintiff in making out his
prima facie case. In successfully defending the second "Corvair case," 7
for example, General Motors, to counter the claim that the Corvair's
doors were weak, brought in a metallurgist from the Universitv of Illinois
and an accident specialist from U.C.L.A., and reconstructed aspects of
the accident by crashing three cars, taking motion pictures of the crashes
in both color and black and white. Although contributory negligence is
not an affirmative defense under the strict tort theory, evidence in the
nature of contributory negligence could be offered to rebut plaintiff's
prima facie case. In Ford Motor Co. v. Mondraon,8 although not a strict
tort case, there was evidence that plaintiff failed to heed a hiehwav
warning sign and failed to timely observe the car with which he collided.
The court held that plaintiff's evidence of defective brakes was insufficient
and that these other factors were more probablv the cause of the
accident. Similarly. in Younq' v. Willvs Motors. Inc.59 the court held
that the more Probable cause of the accident was the driver losing control
of the automobile because of the slipperv roadwqv and not the alleged
defect in the brakes which caused them to lock. Related to Proof in the
nature of contributory negligence is proof of misuse. which is recou-nized
as an affirmative defense.6 0 There are no cases emploving this defense
in the automobile Products liability area. but hypothetical cases could be
constructed where it miaht apDlv, as for example, where the plaintiff
used the automobile to haul a trailer which was too heavy for an auto-
mobile, and the brakes failed while going down a steep hill.
Finally. assumption of the risk is still retained as an affirmative defense.
but for this to aP)lv, Plaintiff must have voluntarily and unreasonablv
proceeded to encounter a known danger.61 This situation will probablv
57. See Time, Sept. 10. 1965, n. 37.
58. 271 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1959).
59. Supra note 48.
60. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., supra note 11.
61. RESTATEMENT, § 402A, comment n.
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not arise very often, and will undoubtedly be limited to those cases where
the manufacturer notifies the owner directly about the defect and its
dangerous propensities, but the owner fails to allow the manufacturer to
repair the defect."
CONCLUSION
Strict tort will not have a significant effect on automobile products
liability litigation, and will make a difference only where foreign cars
and used cars are involved. In particular, the liability of the automobile
manufacturers is not affected by adopting the strict tort theory, and the
only difference in the character of the litigation against manufacturers
in strict tort will be that the manufacturers will no longer introduce
evidence of due care. Improvements in methods and techniques of proof
of causation and defective condition would produce a much more sig-
nificant increase in the liability of manufacturers and sellers of defective
products than produced by the advent of strict tort liability.
William M. Hoffman
62. See Jones v. Hartman Beverage Co., 29 Tenn. App. 265, 203 S.W.2d 166 (1946),
where, under these facts, it was held that the causal chain was broken.
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